嘉    宾：张万昌  助理教授 香港中文大学(深圳）

主持人： 陆卓然 助理教授 8803威尼斯检查中心  

时    间：2025年2月21日（周五）下午 14:00-15:30

地    点:  8803威尼斯检查中心徐汇校区8803威尼斯检查中心A511

内容简介： Propose a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary. It operates as follows. The intermediary publicly commits to charging a fixed commission fee and randomly drawing a spread from a uniform distribution. The buyer and seller simultaneously submit bid and ask prices. If the bid-ask difference exceeds the realized random spread, the asset is sold at the midpoint price, with each party paying half the fixed commission fee. Otherwise, no trade takes place. I show that the random double auction is a dominant-strategy mechanism, guarantees positive profits, and maximizes the profit guarantee.

演讲人简介：Wanchang Zhang received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, San Diego. He previously earned a Master’s degree in Economics from Kyoto University and a Bachelor’s degree in Economics from Xiamen University. His research focuses on microeconomic theory, particularly mechanism design and information design. His job market paper is currently under revise & resubmit at the American Economic Review.